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KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL: THE SUPREME
COURT FOLLOWS UP ON THE DAUBERT TEST
Martin A. Schwartz*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
In order to maintain the flow of the earlier section 1983
discussion, Professor Schwartz and I decided that we would break
his presentation into two parts the gatekeeper role of the trial judge
as to the introduction of scientific evidence. Professor Schwartz
will now speak about Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.'
Professor Schwartz:
Kumho Tire is a follow-up to the 1993 Supreme Court decision
in Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 Daubert has become
a household name along with Miranda and Brown and Roe
Daubert has not one, but two entries in the most recent edition of
the law dictionary. There is one for Daubert hearing4 and there is
one for Daubert test
* B.B.A., Cum Laude, 1966, City College; J.D., Magna Cur Laude, 196q,
Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1973, New York University. Admitted to the Bar
of New York, Federal District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the U.S.
Supreme Court. He was Managing Attorney for the Research and Appeals
Bureau of Westchester Legal Services and an Adjunct Professor at New York
Law School. He has litigated cases in the United States Supreme Court. He is
the author of a monthly column in the New York Law Journal titled "Public
Interest Law," and has lectured for the Practicing Law Institute and is co-
chairman of its annual program on section 1983 litigation. He is a member of the
New York State Bar Association committee on State Constitutional Law. He is
co-author of a two-volume treatise on section 1983 civil rights litigation titled
"Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees" (Second Edition, 1991
and 1995 Cumulative Supplement No. 2), and the author of, "Section 1983
Litigation: Federal Evidence." He has also written numerous articles on civil
rights issues.1 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2 Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 Here the speaker refers to three famous cases: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Kansas, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and
Roe v. Wade, 402 U.S. 941 (1973).
4 Black's Law Dictionary 401 (7h ed. 1999). The definition for "Daubert
hearing" states in part: "A hearing conducted by federal district courts, usu.
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In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the test for the
admissibility of scientific expert testimony was whether the
testimony is relevant and reliable. The Supreme Court held that
the old Frye test, established in Frye v. United States,- more than
seventy years ago which tests whether the scientific evidence
gained general acceptance in The scientific communit , was no
longer the governing test under the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
Under Daubert, the district court is the so-called gatekeeper to
make sure that the scientific evidence .is-both relevant and reliable
establishing several criteria for evaluating reliability.' One was
whether the particular scientific theory has been or is capable of
being tested, so some call that "testability."'" Second, is whether
the scientific theory has been subject to peer review and
publication." Third, whether there is some known rate of error or
before trial, to determine whether proposed expert testimony meets the federal
requirements for relevance and reliability, as clarified by the Supreme Court in
Daubert..." Id.
5 Black's Law Dictionary 401 (7" ed. 1999). The definition for "Daubert test"
states in pertinent part: "A method that federal district courts use to determine
whether expert testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
which generally requires that expert testimony consist of scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge that will assist the fact-finder in understanding the
evidence or determining a fact in issue." Id.
6 See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). "Under the Rules the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589.
7 Frye v. United States, 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 54 App. D.C. 46
(1923); 34 A.L.R. 145 (1923).
8 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. The Court stated specifically: "Given the Rules'
permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony
that does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion that the Rules
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made "general acceptance"
the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere
standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
should not be applied in federal trials." Id.
9 Id. at 592-593. The Court stated that the trial judge must determine these
factors at the outset and emphasized that the set of criteria was not a definitive
checklist or test. Id.
10 Id. at 593. The Court explained: "Scientific methodology today is based on
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified." Id.
Id. at 593. Publication is not absolutely necessary to establish that the
technique has been subjected to peer review, but scrutiny by the scientific
[Vol 16298
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standard for government use of this process.' 2 Finally, it remains as
a factor whether the scientific theory has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. 3 If you think about that
last factor, it is clear that the Frye test still remains relevant under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, but just as a factor rather than as a
governing test. 4
Since the Frye test was around for seventy years it used to be the
leading star of a show, but now it is like a fading actor or actress.
It just has a subordinate role.
Some say that if you look at the way the decision is written, one
of the purposes is to create a flexible framework for the trial judge
in a Federal Court." However, it is also to keep so-called junk
science away from the jury. 6 And the way I heard one expert on
the law of evidence talk about this, the Daubert framework means
that to be admissible, scientific evidence has to not only 'talk the
talk' but also has to 'walk the walk.' That is established by looking
at factors like testability and publication and so forth.'
community increases the chances that flaws in the methodology will be detected.
id.
12 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
13 Id. at 594. General acceptance remains a pertinent factor because a technique
that is known to the relevant scientific community but only gains minimal
support is suspect. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238
(1985)).
14Id. The Court made clear that reliability assessment permits, although it does
not require "explicit identification of relevant scientific community and an
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community." Id.
'5 See Kumho, 536 U.S. 137, 141-142. The Kumho Court in applying the
Daubert framework explained:
"But as the Court stated in Daubert the test of reliability is "flexibility" and
Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same
broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in
respect to its ultimate reliability determination." Id. (citing General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)).
16 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. The danger of junk science, in the view of the
Court, was adequately safeguarded against by conventional devices such as
vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
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Since Daubert was decided in 1993, it has given rise to a large
number of difficult legal issues. There are now scientific law
reporters, entire volumes and treatises on scientific evidence post-
Daubert.8
One of the issues that arose was the scope of appellate review.
In 1998, iqGeneral Electric-v. Joiner- -the United States Supreme
Court held that when the trial judge rules to admit or to exclude the
expert testimony, the standard of review on appeal is abuse of
discretion. '9 That is a deference to the judgment of the judge.
The other big issue discussed in Kumho Tire2" was whether
Daubert was intended to apply on the one hand only to scientific
testimony, or whether it was intended to apply to all expert
testimony.' This became an issue because there is a footnote in the
Daubert opinion that says that we are ruling only on the
admissibility of scientific evidence.' Kumho Tire involved an
automobile accident case resulting from the blowout of a tire,
which caused the vehicle to overturn.23 One person was killed in
18 William W. Schwarzer, MANAGEMENT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE, Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 7 (1994); Margaret A. Berger, EVIDENTIARY
FRAMEWORK, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 37 (1994); Linda A.
Bailey ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE ON EPIDEMIOLOGY, Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence 121 (1994); Bernard D. Goldstein and Mary Sue Henifin,
REFERENCE GUIDE ON TOXICOLOGY, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
181 (1994); Judith A. McKenna ET AL., REFERENCE GUIDE ON FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 273 (1994); David H.
Kaye and David A. Freedman, REFERENCE GUIDE ON STATISTICS, Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 331 (1994); Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E.
Willging, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS, Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence 525 (1994); Margaret .G. Farrell, SPECIAL MASTERS, Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 575 (1994).
19 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). The Court stated: "We
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of Joiner's
experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent" review to that ruling, it
failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse of
discretion review. Id.20 Kumho, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
21 Id. at 147.
22 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, n. 8, where the Court stated: "Rule 702 also
applies to 'technical, or other specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited
to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here."
Id. at 590.
23 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142.
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the accident and a number of others were severely injured, and an
action was brought against the manufacturer of the tire.'
The plaintiffs had an expert, who styled himself as being an
expert in tire failure analysis. ' I do not know if he actually is a
tireologist, but that is what he did, although he did not claim to be
a scientist.26 He said that through touching and by looking at the
tire, he was capable of making an evaluation as to whether the tire
failed as a result of a manufacturing or design defecL "The
expert based his opinion upon a visual aid and tactile inspection of
the tire and upon the theory that in the absence of at least two of
four specific, physical symptoms, indicating tire abuse, the failure
of the sort that occurred here was caused by defect."' By tire
abuse, that did not mean people went around kicking the tire, the
"expert" meant that usually the tire was underinflated.2 The
expert stated that he "was able to tell by looking at the tire and
touching it, whether the blowout was the result of abuse of the tire
or a manufacturing defect."30 As a result of that evaluation, he
came to the conclusion that in this instance the tire blowout was
the result either of a manufacturing defect or a design defect."
In terms of the way the litigation unfolded, this expert opinion
was absolutely critical for the plaintiffs' case, because they sought
to submit this opinion on a motion for summary judgment.' The
plaintiffs' attorneys knew that if they could get this case to a jury,
given what happened here one person killed and a number of




27 Id. at 156. According to the Court, the respondents argued that a method of
tire failure analysis that employs a visual/ tactile inspection is a reliable method,
based on use by other experts, and their own expert's long experience working
for Michelin." Id.28Id.
29 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 144.
30 id.
311d. at 143.32Id. at 145. The opinion stated that "the District Court found all those factors
argued against the reliability of Carlson's [the expert's] methods, and granted
the motion to exclude the testimony (as well as the defendants' accompanying
motion for summary judgment.)" Id.
2000
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getting an excellent recovery. So the key issue here was the
admissibility of this expert opinion.33
The Supreme Court held that the Daubert framework, meaning
the gatekeeper role of the district judge to make sure that expert
testimony is both relevant and reliable, is not limited to scientific
testimony Rather, it applies to all expert testimony that is'sought
to be introduced in the federal courts." That obviously, in itself, is
an important holding.
That ti~d to be .the law, otherwise it would mean that district
court judges could admit expert testimony even if that expert
testimony was never found to be reliable.
The idea that after Daubert, district courts would have authority
to admit expert testimony that was not reliable, never made any
sense. Although this is not earth shattering, it is an important
holding, and an important point resolved by the Court.
The other issue presented in Kumho Tire concerned the four
factors for assessing reliability that were identified in the opinion
for Daubert 6 The four factors were never meant to be an
exclusive listing of factors for evaluating reliability, rather they
were suggested factors that were likely to be important.37 Kumho
Tire is important because the Court said that these factors
identified in Daubert may be applied by the trial judge in a flexible
way38 understanding that they may not all be applicable in every
instance.39
Many experts in Federal Court testify on the basis of expertise
that comes from their experience."0 For example, a plumber, under
3 Id. at 149.
34 Id. at 147. The Court stated: "In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the
Rule's word 'knowledge,' not the words (like 'scientific') that modify that word,
that 'establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability'... Hence as a matter of
language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to all 'scientific,' 'technical,'
or 'other specialized' matters within its scope." Id.
35 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 148.
36 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-595. The four factors are whether the theory or
scientific technique has been tested, subjected to peer review, evaluated in terms
of error rates and generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Id.37
id.
38Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.
39 id.
40 Id. at 149.
302 [Vol 16
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the Federal Rules of Evidence, could be qualified as an expert.4'
Last night, I watched an old version of The Honeymooners with
my daughter. As I was watching that,- I was thinking about this
presentation today, and thinking that Ralph Cramdon could be an
expert witness in bus driving.
One of my favorite expert testimony cases, was the person who
said, "I am an expert because I have smoked marijuana over a
thousand times. I can tell you what marijuana looks like, I can tell
you what it feels like."4 There is another expert who had been
convicted of breaking and entering about seven or eight times.'
The court said, "We are hard pressed to find somebody who has
more expertise in the use of burglar tools." This is the person
who knows what a crowbar is used for, how a burglar uses
flashlights, so forth and so on."45
If you think about these people, the person who has expertise in
marijuana, the plumber, or the burglar, and you think about the
Daubert factors, they probably didn't publish in scholarly journals.
That's not too likely. I guess there could be peer review, maybe,
of someone who smoked marijuana ten thousand times. But in
reality, there is not likely to be peer review.
Kumho Tire stresses the point that district judges would have a
great deal of flexibility in this gatekeeper role in assessing
reliability; it is not only the qualifications of the proposed expert,
but also the methodology that the expert uses, and even the
conclusion that the expert came to." The idea here is that these
factors were never meant to be applied by the federal trial judges in
any type of rigid fashion.
41 Under FRE 702, special education or certification is not required; a person
can qualify as an expert based on his or her "knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education."
42 See United States v. Johnson, 575 F. 2d 1347, 1360 (1978). The opinion
stated: "During voir dire, he [expert] admitted he had smoked marijuana over a
thousand times and he had dealt in marijuana as many as twenty times. He also
said that he had been asked to identify marijuana over a hundred times and had
done so without making a mistake." Id.
43 State v. Briner, 198 Neb. 766 (1977).
44Id at 769.
45 id.
46 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157.
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The district judge has the flexibility now. If you are a litigator,
remember it is great discretion that the district judge has and so do
your best not to aggravate the district judge.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Do not forget that this is a federal rule and New York State
still follows the Frye Rule.47
47 People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417,423 n. 2; 633 N.E.2d 451; 611 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1994). The Court of Appeals declined to apply the Daubert test, stating that the
Supreme Court decision was only binding on the federal courts.
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